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The trial court erred when it imposed minimal support obligations on the 
Appellant (hereinafter w*Mr. Resendes") without taking into account the income Appellee 
(hereinafter i4Ms. Resendes"*) is reasonably capable of earning. Ms. Resendes claims the 
court properly calculated alimony to Mr. Resendes based on a part-time income for Ms. 
Resendes. However, before awarding alimony, the court must first determine the 
financial requirements of the parties, the gross income available to the parties, and the 
recipient spouse's ability to produce income. U.C.A. §30-3-5(8)(a)(i)-(iv). 
U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(7)(c) states in part that "[i]f a parent has no recent work history 
or their occupation is unknown, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum 
wage for a 40-hour work week . . ." In interpreting the statute for correctness, the court 
should have imputed Ms. Resendes' income, based on at least a minimum wage 40-hour 
work week, as the statute specifies, when income is imputed. In not doing so, the court 
created a serious inequity and abused its discretion. 
I. THE STATUTE THE COURT USED REQUIRES IMPUTATION 
OF FULL-TIME EMPLOYMENT INCOME TO MS. RESENDES 
Ms. Resendes claims Mr. Resendes misconstrues U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(7)(c), and 
that this statute should only be applied if U.C.A. §78-45-7.5(7)(d) does not apply. U.C.A. 
§78-45-7.5(7)(c) states: 
If a parent has no recent work history or their occupation is unknown, income 
shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. 
To impute a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding 
officer in an administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as to 
the evidentiary basis for the imputation. 
1 
By using the term "at least"* the legislature obviously contemplated more than 
minimum wage, in appropriate circumstances like these where a party clearly has 
qualifications and skills above those of a minimum wage employee. The court took 
evidence and entered its basis for imputing $16.60 an hour for Ms. Resendes. It simply 
erred in not imputing full time, or at least 36 hours a week. 
Ms. Resendes herself misconstrues this statute where she interprets the statute as 
applying only if there is no work history at all. §78-45-7.5(5)(a)(b)(c) and (d) are not 
mutually exclusive, but should be interpreted as a whole. The statute applies "if there is 
no recent work history." The court did in fact discuss Ms. Resendes' past work history, 
but did not have any current or up-to-date frame of reference to draw from regarding 
income and hours because Ms. Resendes has been unemployed or underemployed; thus, 
the court imputed Ms. Resendes' income. The court based its imputation on an income of 
$16.60 an hour, but only imputed 72 hours a month, or six (6) 12 hour shifts. However, 
the court should have imputed at least a 36-hour work week to Ms. Resendes.1 If the 
court must impute a party's income, the statute and relevant case law dictates that the 
imputation should be based on a full-time income unless there is a compelling reason to 
do otherwise, as stated in subsection (d). §78-45-7.5(5) Utah Code 2004. While Ms. 
Resendes claims that subsection (d) does not require imputation in the absence of those 
circumstances, she provides no viable legal basis to avoid the statutory requirements. The 
appeals court should determine that the trial court has interpreted the statute incorrectly. 
1
 It is common knowledge that hospital nurses work twelve hour shifts, and that therefore 36 hours a week is 
considered full-time. 
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Ms. Resendes' income should be calculated on a full-time basis where Ms. 
Resendes has the ability and capacity to work a 36-hour work week. Her children arc all 
in school full-time, and she has two high school age children to aid her. and Mr. 
Resendes, who has joint legal custody, is available on the weekends, e\ enings, and 
holidays to assist in watching the children. Further, Mr. Resendes supported Ms. 
Resendes' desires to return to nursing school and massage therapy school. He helped care 
for the children and used marital funds to pay for the education, so that Ms. Resendes 
could support herself when needed. Now it is needed. 
II. THE COURT ABUSED IT'S DISCRETION 
AND A SERIOUS INEQUITY AROSE WHEN IT DID NOT 
IMPUTE A FULL-TIME INCOME TO MS. RESENDES 
When the Court relied on UCA §78-45-7.5(7) to impute Ms. Resendes' income, 
the court clearly abused its discretion by not complying with subsection (c) of the statute, 
and should have imputed at least "a 40-hour work week." Ms. Resendes states in her brief 
that the court in Kelly v. Kelly held it would not disturb the trial court's alimony award 
unless inequity results, and the trial court manifested a clear abuse of discretion. Kelly v. 
Kelly, 9 P.3d 171, 179 (Utah App. 2000); quoting Childs v. Childs, 967 P.2d 942, 946 
(Utah App. 1998). Further, Ms. Resendes states that Mr. Resendes does not dispute that 
the Court has "considerable discretion" so long as it does not abuse its discretion. 
Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (1991). 
In this instance, however, the trial court did manifest a clear abuse of discretion, 
wherein the court incorrectly interpreted the statute, and did not include all reasonable 
income available to Ms. Resendes, i.e., her ability to provide for her own support while 
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working full-time as a registered nurse, when the Court calculated alimony to be paid by 
Mr. Resendes. As outlined in U.C.A. §30-3-5(8)(ii), among other factors, the trial court 
must first consider the recipient's earning capacity and ability to produce income before 
awarding alimony to a spouse. 
Ms. Resendes states that there are several Utah cases that have upheld the 
imputation of part-time income to an alimony recipient in a divorce. Ms. Resendes cites 
to Reinhart v. Reinhart, however, in that case the court determined part-time computation 
was appropriate because the custodial parent was attending a full-time graduate nursing 
program, in addition to having primary physical custody of the parties' four minor 
children. Reinhart v. Reinhart, 963 P.2d 757, 758 (Utah App. 1998). In that case, the trial 
court questioned whether the plaintiff could be a full-time student in a graduate nursing 
program as well as work a full-time schedule while caring for her four minor children. Id. 
at 758. This case can be distinguished, wherein Ms. Resendes is not attending school, 
and the parties' children are all in school full-time now. Ms. Resendes obtained a nursing 
degree for just this type of circumstance, so she could work and support herself should 
the need arise. In this case, Mr. Resendes supported Ms. Resendes while she obtained her 
nursing degree during the marriage for just this circumstance. The parties both live in the 
same small town, wherein Mr. Resendes can assist in childcare on the weekends and in 
the evenings while Ms. Resendes is working, and there are two high school age children 
who can assist Ms. Resendes in adequately caring for the younger children. 
Ms. Resendes also cites Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1223 (Utah App. 
1980), a much older case, where the party's income was calculated on a part-time basis 
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because the recipient spouse was caring for three minor age children. However, in that 
case the recipient spouse had a pre-school age child who was not \et in school full-time, 
and the other two children were age eight and under. Further, the mother supported the 
father through his professional training. In contrast, the parties' children in this case arc 
all in school full-time now, and two are attending high school and should be able to assist 
in childcare. Also, Mr. Resendes supported Ms. Resendes through her education and 
training. Therefore, Fletcher is not dispositive, if even relevant. 
Another case Ms. Resendes relies on is Rehn v. Rehn. In that case, the trial court 
refused to impute a higher income to Ms. Rehn, and stated that "it is sufficient to impute 
a lesser income to the recipient spouse so that she might give adequate care and nurturing 
to the parties' minor children/' Rehn v. Rehn, 91A P.2d 306, 311 (Utah App. 1999); 
quoting Fletcher, 615 P.2d at 1223. Contrary to the case at bar, the court does not 
indicate that Ms. Rehn's income is from part-time employment. However, the two 
children in that case were six and nine years old. In this case, Ms. Resendes has two older 
children to help her in providing "adequate care and nuturing" to her two younger 
children, and Mr. Resendes lives in the same small town, and can assist with the childcare 
on weekends and holidays. Moreover, if Ms. Resendes works full-time as a nurse, she 
will only work three 12-hour shifts a week, for a total of 36 hours a week. Assuming she 
worked nights or weekends, she would still have the older children and Mr. Resendes to 
assist her in providing "adequate care and nurturing" for the children during the minimal 
time she would be required to work while the children were in her care. 
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Ms. Resendes states that the court in Cummings, a case Mr. Resendes uses to 
support his position, may have imputed a lesser income than a full-time wage based on 
the mother's highest hourly wage if she had been the custodial parent. Ms. Resendes errs 
in her reading of this case. In fact, the mother was given back custody of the children in 
that case. The trial court's finding that custody should be given to the father was 
overturned, and the appeals court gave custody back to the mother. Fhe court also upheld 
the full-time imputation of the mother's income based on the highest wage she earned, 
even though the mother would be the custodial parent thereafter. Cummings v. 
Cummings, 821 P.2d 472 (Utah App. 1991). 
Finally, Ms. Resendes does not dispute that Mancil v. Smith is the most recent 
ruling from the appeals court. 18 P.3d 509 (Utah App. 2000). It has not been overturned 
or controverted. It clearly provides that it is "Utah's clear policy to require both parents to 
support their child to the extent that each is financially able." Id. at 511. 
The trial court erred in not imputing a full-time income to Ms. Resendes, where 
Ms. Resendes is financially capable of working as a registered nurse at least 36 hours a 
week in three shifts. She is not going to school, and does not have any children at home 
during the day while school is in session. In addition, Mr. Resendes did not help put Ms. 
Resendes through nursing school while they were married so that Ms. Resendes could 
claim only a minimum wage, or only have a part-time income imputed to her; it was their 
obvious intent to help Ms. Resendes be able to support herself. Ms. Resendes has two 
older children at home who can assist with childcare occasionally. Mr. Resendes is 
available in the evenings, on weekends, and holidays to watch the children, so the 
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Resendes' would only incur minimal, if any, childcare expenses. Thus, the trial court 
erred in not calculating Ms. Resendes' income on a full-time basis. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court should have calculated a full-time income to the Appellee, based on 
UCA §78-45-7.5(7)(c), wherein if the court has no recent work history to draw from, the 
court must calculate at least a minimum wage of 40 hours a week. The Appellee has the 
training, health, and ability to earn $2,877.00 per month working as a registered nurse, 
and there are no statutory exceptions or other reasonable basis to avoid imputing full-time 
income. Based upon the foregoing facts and argument, Appellant respectfully prays that 
this court reverse the trial court on this issue, and order that support in this divorce be re-
calculated, based upon Appellee's income in the amount of $2,877.00 per month. 
Respectfully submitted this dyl day of August 2006. 
SCRIBNER & McCANDLESS, P.C 
\ LORIE D. FOWLKE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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